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Abstract: This research addresses blackhole and selective forwarding routing attacks, which 
are fundamental security attacks on the routing of data in IoT networks. Most IoT devices today, 
from medical devices to connected vehicles and even smart buildings, have the capability of 
communicating wirelessly with one another. Although, consumers are progressively embracing 
the concept of connected devices, recent studies indicate that security is not high on the priority 
list of manufacturers, especially in the way these IoT devices route and communicate data 
amongst themselves. Thus, it leaves the door wide open to attacks and compromises. In this 
study, a trust-based routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks, addressing blackhole 
and selective forwarding attacks is proposed. We show that our proposed protocol is not only 
secure from blackhole and selective forwarding attacks, but also does not impose undue 
overheads on network traffic. 
Keywords: IoT, RPL, Trust, Blackhole attacks, Selective Forwarding attacks 
Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) can be described as a trend causing a global technological 
disruption today as a result of a melding of advances in computing and communication 
enterprises (Airehrour et al., 2016). IoT is set to transform, not only the user-to-machine 
interaction, but also the way machine-to-machine interacts. Already, we are witnessing the 
penetration of IoT devices in the market place. Various industrial sectors have begun 
witnessing the infiltration of IoT products into the fabric of several industries, including 
healthcare, energy, automotive and agriculture. Increasingly in these industries, users are 
witnessing the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), where devices such as sensors, exercise fit 
bits, robots and insulin pumps are progressively becoming more connected to one another 
(Chinn et al., 2014). It is perceived that Internet of Things will not only significantly change 
the future of the industrial sectors of the world but also will bring a positive transformation to 
how we live. A culmination of the full potential of the IoT vision will improve the standards of 
living of humanity because of the numerous value-creation opportunities while also improving 
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the careers of many (Ericsson, 2011). It is expected that the wide adoption of IoT will lead to a 
plethora of novel smart paradigms like smart healthcare, smart agriculture and smart power, 
amongst others. This could eventually evolve into new ecosystems of IoT that are propelled by 
self-aware, autonomous machines. 
However, the fact that these devices can communicate with one another and over the web, 
poses a security risk to the Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) and other connected online 
devices, and hence requires better security mechanisms. There is no doubt that IoT is creating 
a new epoch of innovation that connects the digital and machine ecosystems and brings better 
speed and effectiveness to many sectors as recounted above. Nevertheless, with sensitive 
information increasingly being made available online via the deployment of IoT, and more 
endpoints exposed to attackers, the research community – and indeed the business world – 
are swiftly recognising that security in IoT networks and IoT generally cannot be an 
afterthought. 
A study by McKinsey (Chinn et al., 2014) projects that the cost of cybersecurity will increase 
to $3 trillion by 2020 and of this, many of the security technology measures are futile. Further 
to the projection by Ericsson (Ericsson, 2011) that the number of connected devices will reach 
50 billion by 2020, there is a pressing need to profoundly rethink security for the always-
connected, high-volume and distributed world of the Internet of Things. One typical area of 
exposure in IoT is the routing packets between different IoT devices. These packets move 
across heterogeneous networks and are thus susceptible to various security attacks common 
to both the digital and machine world. At this stage of the nascent development of IoT, the 
security challenges need to be addressed to engender confidence in the public and globally 
achieve success with IoT. 
The objective of this research is to develop a lightweight trust-based Routing Protocol for low 
power and Lossy networks (RPL) that will address blackhole and selective forwarding attacks 
in IoT. A blackhole attack is a denial-of-service (DoS) class of attack in which a malicious node 
drops data packets rather than forwarding them towards the expected destination. In a 
selective forwarding attack, a malicious node examines the packets received and then decides 
on the class of packets to drop. "Class of packets" indicates either data packets or route packets 
but not both. The intention, in both attacks, is to destabilise the network and the flow of data 
in the network (DoS). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: a discussion on the IoT routing protocols and the 
current industry standards is presented; this is followed by an introduction of the security 
features available in RPL with a highlight on the challenges in its implementation. A trust-
based mechanism for RPL routing protocol is further introduced as a mitigation strategy 
against the RPL attacks. We show that our proposed protocol is both secure from blackhole 
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and selective forwarding attacks, while not imposing undue overheads on network traffic. We 
present our simulation results using the Contiki/Cooja environment and we demonstrate the 
efficacy of our proposed trust-based RPL routing protocol. Finally, we present our conclusions 
and final notes on our future work. 
Internet of Things: A Routing Protocol Perspective 
Routing Protocols in IoT 
A routing protocol is a communication process tasked with the responsibility of making 
intelligent routing decisions during the forwarding of routing data among nodes. Routing in 
sensor networks could be classified into two types, namely: reactive routing system (where a 
sender node triggers a route discovery to transmit data packets to a destination node) and 
proactive routing system (where a node constantly searches for path information to a 
destination network, so that the path is ready before it is required). Protocols developed are 
based on any of these two systems (Kute et al., 2012). 
Routing Protocols for Low Power and Lossy Networks 
The Routing protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) is an IPv6 routing protocol 
designed by the Routing Over Low power and Lossy networks (ROLL) of the Internet 
Engineering Task Group Force (IETF) (Winter et al., 2012). RPL was designed as a standard 
for low power and lossy networks, which includes all IoT sensor nodes. RPL is a protocol based 
on proactive routing, which operates by discovering routes after the RPL protocol commences. 
It forms a tree-like topology known as Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG). 
Every node in the RPL network selects a preferred parent based on some metrics (hop-count, 
expected transmission count, link reliability and link colour object) and this preferred parent 
acts like a gateway for that node. If a node seeks to forward a packet for which it does not have 
a path in its routing table, it simply forwards it to its preferred parent, which has a path either 
to the destination or to its own parent for onward transmission until it gets to the final 
destination in the tree. Path selection is an important factor for RPL, and hence the protocol 
uses multiple metrics for this purpose. Every node in the DODAG computes its rank from the 
perspective of the position of the DODAG root node (sink) and in relation to the position of 
the other nodes. The rank of a node decreases in the upward direction towards the DODAG 
root while it increases from the DODAG root towards the leaf nodes (sender nodes). RPL 
operates in two modes to perform downward routing: RPL non-storing mode (source routing) 
and RPL storing mode (stateful in-network routing). In storing mode, each packet holds the 
route path to the destination. This entails the DODAG root maintaining details about each 
node within the network. It is important to note that when operating in a non-storing mode, 
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forwarding RPL nodes in the network need to retain their in-network routing tables to identify 
where to send their packets. However, in both modes discussed above, the RPL DODAG root 
still retains a database of all nodes for downward routing purposes (Winter et al., 2012). 
RPL utilises three control message types for the creation and maintenance of its graph 
topology and route table. The control messages include: DODAG Information Object (DIO), 
DODAG Advertisement Object (DAO) and DODAG Information Solicitations (DIS). DIO is 
used for creation, maintenance and discovery of the DODAG topology. When an RPL network 
is started, nodes exchange DODAG information via the DIO. The DIO helps nodes to select 
their preferred parents. RPL uses DAO messages to transmit the prefix of a node to its ancestor 
nodes for downward routing purposes. The DIS message is used by any unattached node in 
the network to solicit for a potential parent node. DIS is triggered by a node in a situation when 
it cannot obtain a DIO after a certain time interval (Winter et al., 2012). The creation of a RPL 
network in a DODAG is referred to as a RPL instance. While many RPL instances can consist 
within a DODAG, these RPL instances can have their own unique object functions (OF) for 
routing purposes. 
Security in RPL 
Security has been identified as being critical in sensor networks that are resource constrained 
(Le et al., 2012). In addition, the complexity of deployment and size is also a core concern for 
these resource-constrained networks, such that it may not be cost effective, if not practically 
unrealistic, to embed sophisticated security mechanisms in an implementation of a RPL 
system. Further to that, several RPL deployments can resort to link-layer security or other 
security systems to achieve their security goals while bypassing the security features that RPL 
may provide. Consequently, RPL security features could then be mere optional and non-
obligatory extensions. RPL nodes can operate in three predefined security options.  
The first is referred to as the "unsecured" option. In this option, the control messages in RPL 
are forwarded with no security primitives. The unsecured status implies that the RPL network 
could as well have adopted other security mechanisms (such as a link-layer security) to achieve 
application-specific requirements.  
The second option is referred to as "pre-installed". In this option, nodes entering an RPL 
instance come embedded with pre-installed keys, which grants them processing and 
generation permission to safeguard RPL messages.  
The third option is referred to as "authenticated". This option permits nodes to enter a network 
as leaf nodes using the embedded pre-installed keys while operating in a pre-installed mode, 
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or nodes operate as multicasting nodes by getting a key from a central authentication 
authority.  
In the last two options, there is a secure variant for every RPL message. The security features 
of 32-bit and 64-bit message authentication code (MAC) and encrypted message 
authentication code (ENC-MAC) options are well supported, while the algorithms (CCM and 
AES-128-bit encryption) have become new supported extensions in RPL as specified in the 
protocol messages (Winter et al., 2012). The safe variants of the RPL messages are meant to 
provide confidentiality, integrity, delay protection and replay protection as an added option.  
However, the bad news is they all rely on past encryption solutions that have failed – and 
which continue to fail (Nordrum, 2016). Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) was developed about 
four decades ago to safeguard the communications between two human parties. It was at no 
time designed to handle the complications of managing industrial-scale networks of 50 billion 
devices that IoT promises to usher in. The very thought of having a central authentication 
authority for billions of devices makes it extremely awkward and inefficient. 
Attacks in RPL 
The RPL protocol, like any other wireless sensor network protocol, has been shown to be 
vulnerable to routing attacks. These attacks have been researched and covered in (Chugh et 
al., 2012; Tsao et al., 2014; Wallgren et al., 2013) among other papers; Table 1 shows a 
summary of attacks in RPL and some proposed solutions.  
In (Weekly & Pister, 2012) the authors assume the use of cryptography and they specifically 
use the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) as the hash function to protect the route messages 
being transmitted. The researchers also assume that the cryptographic system utilised is 
guaranteed hence, it will not be tampered with by any malicious nodes. As discussed under 
the section “Security in RPL”, the use of cryptography (SHA-1) will certainly deplete the 
battery energy of the nodes and hence degrade network performance.  
The assumption that the attacking nodes will not tamper with the cryptographic system makes 
the proposed solution impracticable in a real-world scenario. Of equal importance is the 
mobility of the nodes, when these nodes join and leave the network at will, implementing 
encryption becomes difficult as a specific node with certain network details required by other 
nodes suddenly becomes unavailable. The authors of (Raza et al., 2013) revealed the 
weaknesses in the implementation of the ContikiRPL viz-a-viz malicious attacks, and thus 
gave helpful insight into design issues that could help in the implementation of a better 
ContikiRPL. Raza et al. (2013) implemented an IDS system to defend against sinkhole and 
selective forwarding attacks and opined that it could also detect blackhole attacks; however, 
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they assumed that key IDS nodes must be strategically placed. With a deluge of IoT devices 
randomly and remotely located, this may not be the case, and thus may not provide optimal 
defence against attacks. 
Selective forwarding attacks work much like blackhole attacks; however in this type of attack, 
the malicious node selectively drops route or data packets so that it is almost imperceptible to 
the system that the loss was intentional. Most Selective attacks choose between dropping data 
packets or route packets. When a Selective forwarding attacker decides to drop only data 
packets, it does not intercept route packets. In this way, testing the end-to-end connectivity in 
a network will show no network problems, but packets still are not delivered to their 
destinations. Selective forwarding attacks have been discussed in several works and we 
present some references for further reading (Bysani & Turuk, 2011; Hu et al., 2014; 
Mathur et al., 2016; Ren et al., 2016).  
A summary of various attacks and proposed solutions is presented in Table 1. In addition, 
Table 1 highlights the impact of the proposed solutions on network performance. In a later 
section, we present an algorithmic trust-based approach to secure the RPL routing protocol. 
This proposed protocol, when implemented in RPL, counters blackhole and selective 
forwarding attacks. 
A Trust-Based Mechanism for RPL Protocol 
Blackhole and selective forwarding attacks perform malicious activities like causing high 
packet drops and high route and control packet overhead, which depletes the limited resources 
of the IoT nodes. When malicious nodes propagate blackhole and selective forwarding attacks, 
network latency increases and the ranks of the nodes are altered, which causes a disruption to 
the RPL network topology and to its stability. Additionally, the rank alteration causes the 
nodes to re-compute their ranks. The rank alteration triggers a local repair – a self-healing 
mechanism that RPL uses to eliminate local routing loops. However, with the increase in these 
(blackhole and selective forwarding) attacks, the local repair eventually becomes inefficient, 
prompting a global repair by the DODAG root. A continuous initiation of these repair messages 
causes inefficiencies and disruption to the RPL network. 
The section “Security in RPL” asserts that the security-related solutions to prevent malicious 
activities in RPL, which include cryptography and authentication operations, are unable to 
cope with the billions of IoT devices. Besides, the encryption technology could be considered 
complex and energy consuming in the context of the limited available resources of the IoT 
sensor nodes. Therefore, a trust-based mechanism which employs a lightweight solution with 
respect to the limited resources of the nodes, presents an interesting solution for the security 
of RPL routing. 
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Table 1 Summary of RPL Attacks and Countermeasures 
Type of attack Consequence on performance of 
network 
Some proposed solutions 
Rank Minimal packet delivery and high packet 
loss; high-cost path selection and routing 
loop 
IDS centred solutions (Raza et 
al., 2013), (Amin et al., 2009), 
VeRA (Dvir et al., 2011), TRAIL 
(Perreyet al., 2013) 
Selective 
forwarding 
Destabilisation of route topology Heartbeat protocol (Wallgren et 
al., 2013) 
Sinkhole Transmitting network traffic via attacker 
node 
IDS centred solutions (Raza et 
al., 2013), Parent fail-over, rank 
authentication technique 
(Weekly & Pister, 2012) 
Hello flooding Degrading of sensor energy The initiation of RPL’s local and 
global repair system addresses 
this attack 
Wormhole Destabilisation of route topology and 
network traffic 
A Markle tree authentication 
solution system (Zhang et al., 
2014) 
Sybil and Clone ID Route traffic truncation and node traffic 
isolation 
Routing attacks and 
countermeasures in RPL-Based 
IoT (Wallgren et al., 2013) 
Denial of Service Unavailability of network resources User centred IDS based system 
(Kasinathan et al., 2013) 
Blackhole High packet drop-rate and high control 
and route traffic overhead 
SVELTE (Raza et al., 2013), A 
packet traffic counter monitoring 
system (Chugh et al., 2012), A 
parent system fail-over 
mechanism (Weekly & Pister, 
2012), 
Version number High traffic latency and high control 
overhead with minimal packet delivery 
ratio. 
VeRA (Dvir et al., 2011) 
Local repair and 
Control overhead 
Route and control traffic destabilisation IDS system for intrusion 
detection (Le et al., 2012) 
Neighbour attack Falsification of route and network resource 
depletion 
TRAIL (Perrey et al., 2013) 
DIS attack Network resource depletion TRAIL (Perrey et al., 2013) 
 
Embedding Trust in RPL 
We describe below our proposed trust-based mechanism, which is embedded into RPL 
protocol. The aim of the mechanism is to compute a trust value for each node in the RPL 
network while embedding computed trust values for routing decisions. In this way, our 
proposed mechanism will deliver the combined values of providing an optimal routing 
decision while also isolating malicious nodes that may seek to drop control and route packets. 
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The trust mechanism also computes the effective feedback values between nodes. In our 
model, we make two basic assumptions:  
i) that every node operates in promiscuous mode hence, they can overhear neighbour 
packet transmissions; and  
ii) that every blackhole attacking node will over time begin to drop all route packets 
thus, the effective feedback communications between nodes (i.e. the number of 
packets a node could satisfactorily forward on behalf of the requesting node) will 
certainly reflect the blackhole nature of any node.  
In our new protocol, a trust-based mechanism is embedded into RPL to enhance its 
capability to isolate blackhole attacks and selective forwarding. 
When RPL is initially started, a comparison is made between nodes based on the expected 
transmission count and the rank of the nodes. These are normal RPL operations to determine 
preferred parents and routing decisions. Further to that, our computed trust values, as 
depicted in equation 1, are sorted in descending order of magnitude of trust. The 
corresponding trusted node(s) are selected for routing decisions while still maintaining the 
rank order of all nodes in the RPL network. The trust is computed as: 
𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗  =  
𝑁𝑑𝑙𝑣
𝑁𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
Where Ndlv is the number of node i’s packets delivered through node j and Nsent is the total 
number of packets sent by node i to node j. Our trust-based algorithm is shown in Figure 1. 
RPL uses routing metrics defined in its Objective Function to create the DODAG. Essentially, 
the routing metrics defined in the objective function help in the creation of the network routes 
and hence, resulting in an optimal route. In the Contiki implementation of RPL, there are two 
objective functions, namely: Minimum Rank with Hysteresis Objective Function (MRHOF) 
based on RFC 6719 (Gnawali, 2012) and Objective Function zero (OF0). Contiki uses MRHOF 
by default, which minimises the expected transmission count (ETX) values. This research 
work compares the MRHOF’s implementation of RPL with our trust-based implementation of 
RPL. 
(1) 
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Algorithm for blackhole and selective forwarding attacks detection 
Let N1 ← one available item in the NeighbourList[ ] 
Let N2 ← another item next to N1 in the NeighbourList[ ] 
   Compute     𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑗  =  
𝑁𝑑𝑙𝑣
𝑁𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
     
   If (N1.ETX<= ETX_Limit) & (N2.ETX<=ETX_Limit) 
 If (N1.Rank <= Rank_Self) & (N2.Rank <+ Rank_Self) 
     Preferred_Parent = N1.EP > N2.EP ? N1 : N2; 
 Else 
     If (N1.Rank <= Self_Rank) || (N2.Rank <= Self_Rank) 
         Preferred_Parent = N1.Rank < N2.Rank ? N1 : N2 
     Else 
           Preferred_Parent = NULL; 
    Else 
        If (N1.ETX <= ETX_Limit) || (N2.ETX <= ETX_Limit) 
           Preferred_Parent = N1.ETX <= N2.ETX ? N1 : N2; 
        Else 
            Preferred_Parent = NULL; 
    Return Preferred_Parent 
End program 
Figure 1 A trust-based algorithm for the isolation of malicious nodes in RPL 
Simulation and Results 
In the simulation, we have assumed that the IoT sensors are deployed in a smart building with 
one level. The InstantContiki 3.0 platform (Thingsquare, 2016) is used to perform the 
simulation. The various simulation parameters are listed in Table 2. During simulation, the 
system considers the interference from its surroundings, such as other devices or technologies 
that may be in use. We have also used the TMote Sky mote (Cooja simulator) for simulation 
and have defined the IEEE 802.15.4 broadcast range to be 50 metres and the interference 
range as 100 metres. 
Table 2 Simulation parameters of a 30-node network 
Simulation Parameters 
Simulation tool  Contiki/Cooja 3.0 
Mote type Tmote Sky 
Simulation run time 3600 seconds 
Simulation coverage area 70m x 70m 
Interference range 100m 
Total number of nodes 30 
Root node (sink) 1 
Blackhole attack nodes 3 
Legitimate nodes 26 
Deployment environment Smart building 
Wireless transmission range 50 metres 
Network protocol IP based 
Routing protocol RPL 
 
Figure 2 shows the deployment of sensor nodes. The blackhole attacking nodes are coloured 
pink and were allowed to run as good behaving nodes for a while before being manually 
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activated, after a certain time has elapsed, to act maliciously. The same topology was also used 
for the deployment and simulation of the selective forwarding attacks. As shown in Figure 2, 
nodes 28, 29 and 30 were used for blackhole and selective forwarding attacks during RPL 
operations. In the simulation study, we have assumed that the attack nodes behave as good 
nodes from the start and commence their malicious activities over time (when activated). 
Figure 3 shows the activation of the blackhole attacker node (node 28) after a set threshold 
timer while Figure 10 shows the activation of the selective forwarding attacker node (node 30). 
The set threshold timer is set to 5 seconds, by which time, the network is assumed to have 
converged based on the specifications of RPL routing operations. 
Blackhole attacks 
The section following presents the simulation results of the blackhole attacks’ detection and 
the associated network performance measurements.  
Detection and Isolation 
In the simulation, sender nodes transmit packets to the sink node with the following stamp on 
each packet sent: time, source ID, packet type (sent or received), destination ID, sequence 
number and data size. This is shown in Figure 4. Packet sequence IDs are matched to ensure 
that packets sent are received by the sink node. Any sent packet sequence ID that is not 
matched with a corresponding received sequence ID by the sink node has either been black 
holed by the malicious node or affected by the lossy network link. However, the simulations 
showed strong reachability from the sender nodes to their neighbours. Furthermore, we have 
examined the packets dropped by the malicious nodes and they corresponded to the packets 
that have failed to reach the sink node. A complete log of the sent and received packets was 
analysed and the results presented in Figure 6. In Figure 5, the trust-based RPL protocol could 
detect and isolate the blackhole attacks during routing operations. A highlight of the attacks 
detected can be seen from the encircling blue pen-mark. In addition, Figure 5 displays a graph 
summary of attacks detected and isolated during RPL operation using the trust-based RPL 
protocol over a 60-minute simulation period at an interval of 5 minutes. As many as 600 
attacks were detected between the 40th and 45th minute of the RPL operation. Conversely, in 
MRHOF's RPL implementation these attacks could not be detected, as there was no 
mechanism to detect nor isolate blackhole attacks. 
It is of note that in RPL routing, a node rank change shows a re-alignment of a child-node to 
another preferred parent-node. Blackhole attack nodes advertise themselves to their 
neighbour nodes as better routes in a guise to attract these unsuspecting nodes while 
eventually dropping their packets. In Figure 7, a comparison of the frequency of node rank 
changes between the two routing protocols is made. RPL with MRHOF showed high frequency 
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in rank changes reflecting its high level of susceptibility to blackhole attacks while our trust-
based RPL protocol showed a very marginal level of susceptibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 A network topology view of the IoT sensor nodes 
Network Performance 
Even though we have a protocol in place which could detect and isolate blackhole attacks 
during RPL operations, it becomes imperative that the new protocol should not impose undue 
overhead on the network performance. We present below a measurement of network 
throughput and packet loss rates to determine if our proposed protocol can deliver reasonable 
levels of network performance while isolating blackhole attacks when compared to MRHOF’s 
RPL. 
In Figure 8, the trust-based RPL showed significant improvement in throughput over the 
standard RPL (MRHOF). In fact, the throughput measurement of nodes 2-9, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22 
and 25 was 0 kbps under MRHOF’s RPL because of the blackhole attacks on the network. 
This indicates that these nodes were child-nodes to a blackhole parent-node. Meanwhile, with 
the trust-based RPL protocol, none of the nodes had a throughput of 0 kbps, which implies 
that no child node had a blackhole parent node. This indicates that these nodes were child-
nodes to a blackhole parent-node. Meanwhile, with the trust-based RPL protocol, none of the 
nodes had a throughput of 0 kbps which implies that no child node had a blackhole parent 
node. 
Figure 9 displays a graphical representation of the percentage of packet losses in RPL routing 
operation under blackhole attacks. While the trust-based RPL protocol's packet loss stayed 
below 40%, the standard RPL (MRHOF) recorded a staggering 60 to 100% packet loss rate.  
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Thus, the two network performance measurements presented above justify the trust-based 
RPL routing protocol as a better performing protocol over the standard RPL (MRHOF) under 
blackhole attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Blackhole attack activation in a RPL simulation network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 A sequence of packets sent and received by the sender and sink nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Detection of Blackhole attacking nodes during RPL operation 
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Figure 6 Trust-based detection and isolation of blackhole attacks in RPL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Comparison of frequency of node rank changes during blackhole attacks in RPL network 
during simulation 
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Figure 8 Comparison of throughput measurements between RPL (MRHOF) and Trust-based RPL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Packet loss rate comparison between RPL (MRHOF) and Trust-based RPL 
 
Selective Forwarding Attacks 
A summary of the simulation results of the selective forwarding attacks detection, isolation 
and network performance measurement are presented below. 
Detection and Isolation 
This section discusses the results of the simulation study of MRHOF-RPL and Trust-based 
RPL under selective forwarding attacks. As shown in Figure 10, node 30 was manually 
activated for selective forwarding attacks during RPL simulation. Similarly, other attack nodes 
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(28 and 29) were also activated. As explained in the sub-section under “Attacks in RPL”, a 
selective forwarding attack is a subtle variation of a blackhole attack where malicious nodes 
selectively drop packets during routing communications. From the results shown in Figure 11, 
Trust-based RPL could detect and isolate selective forwarding attacks during routing 
operations. In the simulation, the first 25 minutes of RPL operation witnessed a flooding of 
selective forwarding attacks. However, starting from the 30th minute, the attacks were 
progressively and significantly reduced because Trust-Based RPL protocol could identify and 
isolate the malicious nodes. Hence, those malicious nodes were not subsequently considered 
for future routing decisions. On the other hand, MRHOF-RPL was not able to identify any of 
the selective forwarding attacks being perpetrated in the RPL network as evident from the high 
frequency of node rank changes shown in Figure 12. MRHOF-RPL showed significantly higher 
frequency node rank changes over our proposed trust-based RPL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Activation of Selective Forwarding attacks in a RPL simulation network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Detection and isolation of Selective Forwarding Attacks in a RPL simulation network 
 
A RPL network with a stable topology will send route and control information based on the 
DIO trickle timer while the timer value increases with a stable network. However, an RPL 
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network environment with high network topology changes will cause frequent transmission of 
control and route information. The topology changes could be due to the mobility of nodes or 
to suspicious activities of some malicious nodes in the network. This makes it necessary to 
have node re-alignment with new parents and that, in turn, results in a high frequency of rank 
changes among the nodes. Since the nodes are not mobile, we can conclude that changes in 
the rank of the nodes are purely because of the suspicious activities of the malicious nodes in 
the RPL network.  
Figure 12 below provides a comparison of the frequency of changes in the node rank between 
the MRHOF-RPL and the Trust-based-RPL. MRHOF-RPL showed significantly higher node 
rank changes over our Trust-based RPL protocol reflecting a higher level of vulnerability to 
Rank attacks. As shown in the Figure, node 3 of the MRHOF-RPL had an initial spike of 800 
node rank changes while that frequency in most other nodes ranges from 800 to 1,100. This 
range clearly reflects a high destabilisation of the network topology. As mentioned earlier in 
the paper, the high frequency of node rank changes not only destabilises the RPL network, but 
also affects both the efficiency and performance of any RPL network. Except for the spike 
experienced on node 6 with a node rank change of about 450 (refer to Figure 12), the Trust-
based RPL protocol maintained a fairly consistent value of less than 400 node rank changes 
throughout the simulation time of 60 minutes. 
 
Figure 12: Comparison of frequency of node rank changes during Selective Forwarding attacks in RPL 
network simulation 
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Network Performance 
Here we present a comparison of the MRHOF-RPL and the proposed Trust-based RPL during 
selective forwarding attacks based on network throughout and packet loss. As shown in Figure 
13, in MRHOF-RPL, seven nodes, namely, 6, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, and 26, have zero kbps 
throughput indicating that they are aligned to malicious parents that have selectively 
blackholed their packets. For example, following are the number of packets transmitted by 
each of these nodes that are not delivered to the sink node: Node 6 (packet sent, 52), Node 15 
(packet sent, 52), Node 17 (packet sent, 52), Node 19 (packet sent, 52), Node 20 (packet sent, 
52), Node 22 (packet sent, 52) and Node 26 (packet sent, 52). The remaining nodes, although 
they had some packets delivered to the sink node however, by observing their disproportionate 
packet delivery rates, we can conclude that they were affected by the activities of the malicious 
nodes in the network. 
On the contrary, Trust-based-RPL has shown significant improvement in throughput over 
MRHOF-RPL and has maintained a much higher throughput range overall, except for nodes 
2 and 23 that record less than 2 kbps in throughput due to malicious activities. Thus, we can 
conclude that, as evident from Figure 13, our Trust-based RPL protocol provides much better 
network throughput than the MRHOF-RPL protocol during selective forwarding attacks.  
 
Figure 13: Comparison of network throughput between Trust-based-RPL and MRHOF-RPL during Selective 
Forwarding attacks 
Figure 14 presents a comparison of the two protocols with regards to the percentage of packet 
losses in each node. From the Figure, it is evident that under selective forward attacks, while 
MRHOF-RPL had 60-70% lost packets during RPL operation, in the case of Trust-based RPL 
it was only 30%. This proves the efficacy of our Trust-based RPL protocol in delivering an 
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acceptable network performance while isolating selective forwarding attack nodes in the 
network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Percentage of packet loss in Trust-based-RPL and MRHOF-RPL protocols during selective forwarding 
attacks 
Conclusions 
In IoT networks, compromised sensor nodes can destabilise the integrity of data routing by 
intentionally (a) transmitting incorrect control and route information, (b) dropping all 
packets, (c) injecting false routing information during data aggregation, and (d) hampering 
the forwarding of composite data. Since cryptographic methods have proved to be inadequate 
in the prevention of these attacks, especially on a massive scale of billions of IoT nodes, a trust-
based RPL protocol has been presented in this paper. The proposed novel reliable routing 
protocol provides a feedback-back based trust-aware security protocol for IoT networks. The 
protocol computes a trust value for any node in the IoT network based on the good packet 
forwarding behaviour of neighbouring network nodes. The trust value is dependent on the 
positive feedbacks observed about the packet forwarding behaviour among nodes. From 
results presented in the simulation, we therefore conclude that our proposed trust-based RPL 
protocol can provide comprehensive security against blackhole and selective forwarding 
attacks. 
Our future work intends to incorporate energy metrics into the protocol to isolate the nodes 
with depleting energy levels from routing decisions, while providing them with the 
opportunity to recoup their battery power. 
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